Does Science Discredit Religion? by Worrall, John
Does Science Discredit Religion? 
 
JOHN WORRALL 
(ABOUT TO APPEAR –W ITH REPLY BY DEL RATZCH – IN PETERSON 
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We get the ages of rock, and they get the rock of ages; we work out how the heavens 
go and they work out how to get to heaven.   
(Old saying amongst some scientists.) 
 
Strong Son of God, immortal love, 
Whom we, who have not seen Thy face, 
By faith, and faith alone, embrace, 
Believing where we cannot prove. 
(Tennyson, In Memoriam) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Science and religion are in irreconcilable conflict – or so I shall argue in this chapter.  
There is no way in which you can be both properly scientifically-minded and a true 
religious believer. 
 
This might seem a surprising thesis in view of the undoubted fact that many scientists 
(even some of the most eminent ones) were or are also religious believers of one sort 
or another.  But this results, I hold, from a mixture of three factors: (i) a simple failure 
to think things through fully; (ii) a failure to be properly scientific (as I shall explain, 
this involves more than simply giving due weight to well-accredited scientific results 
and theories, it also involves bringing a scientific attitude to the appraisal of claims 
and the weighing of evidence in general); (iii) adopting the attitude hinted at in the 
first of my mottoes – one that holds that science and religion not only do not conflict, 
they cannot conflict, because they cover quite different domains. 
 
The structure of my argument is very simple.  I begin by analysing the attitude just 
mentioned in (iii), arguing that, when properly understood, that attitude is (essentially) 
untenable for a religious person – the cost of adopting it is too high. This entails that 
both the scientist and the religious believer are playing the same game, they are both 
making substantive, descriptive, ‘explanatory’ claims about the way the world is.  But 
then they must surely also play by the same rules - all such claims must be judged by 
how well they stand up to the evidence.  This, of course, is indeed how claims in 
science are appraised and accredited.  When religious claims are appraised in this 
way, however, they all turn out to be untenable.  Science, or rather a scientific 
attitude, is incompatible with religious belief. 
 
Two Separate Domains? 
 
The view is perhaps increasing in popularity that science and religion are about 
different domains, are two different ‘non-overlapping magisteria’ (NOMA) as the 
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eminent biologist Stephen Jay Gould has recently put it;1 and hence that, when 
properly understood, there can be no conflict between them.  I can see three ways in 
which that view might be interpreted. 
 
On one interpretation the view simply attempts to legislate away any clash by creating 
a separate, ‘spiritual reality’, alongside ordinary ‘material reality’ – science teaches us 
about the latter, religion about the former.  But this is based on a confusion – it 
elevates a (perhaps natural, but clearly sloppy) way of speaking into an obviously 
untenable ontological doctrine.  There is only one reality; that reality either does or 
does not contain a god, an afterlife or whatever, just as it either does or does not 
contain quarks or superstrings or whatever; and the question that needs to be 
addressed about both sets of equally unobservable (alleged) entities is what evidence 
we have for their existence.2  To take an analogy: defenders of the paranormal, like 
Uri Geller, may speak loosely of ‘another reality’ beyond the mundane one, but what 
they really mean of course is that extrasensory perception and psychokinetic powers 
are aspects of this reality – what else could they mean?  If what they claim to be true 
is true, then ESP and psychokinetic powers are parts of this reality (what else?).  The 
question is simply whether what they say is true (or rather, since they are talking 
about (alleged) things that are not directly observable, whether there is good evidence 
that what they say is true).  If religion is committed to making allegedly factual 
assertions about the world, whether about its material or (supposed) spiritual aspects, 
then science and religion seem to be two competing ‘magisteria’ not distinct ones. 
 
Or are they?  On a second way of understanding the ‘NOMA’ view (perhaps to be 
thought of as a refinement of the first), religion does indeed make descriptive, factual 
assertions about the universe – even about some of its ‘material’ aspects - but there is 
no conflict because religion kicks in only once science has gone as far as it can.  
Newton’s theory may have given a perfect explanation of the movements of the 
planets (let’s suppose) but of course it gives no explanation of how those planets were 
created.  Religion should avoid interfering in the law-governed ‘mundane’ reality of 
planetary motions (religious sentiments led even Newton himself to make a mistake 
here) but it comes into its own at the level of creation.  One problem with this version 
of the view, as the example illustrates, is that the line between what science can 
explain and what it cannot has a habit of shifting  – we do now have well-accredited 
theories of the formation of the solar system, ones radically at odds with those 
invented earlier by theists.  
 
But, shifting or not, there always is a line - at any stage in science, there will be 
features of the universe (those described by the most fundamental theories then 
available) that science treats as ‘bottom line’: being most fundamental exactly means 
that those theories cannot (to repeat: cannot at that stage in science) themselves be 
explained.   The suggestion, then, might be that religion can penetrate to a deeper 
level, by explaining why those scientifically basic theories are true; and that there is 
no clash because, by definition, science has nothing to say at that deeper level.  But 
think what such a claim would entail.  Surely in order to count, not as mere 
                                                 
1 See his interesting (2001). 
2 Those of you who may have heard of ‘multi-universe’ interpretations of quantum mechanics should 
not be confused – according to such interpretations (which by the way have precious little to 
recommend them), the universe has many (causally non-connected) sub-parts.  (Again there is nothing 
else they could mean!) 
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speculative assertions, but as genuine explanations – any such ideas presented by 
religion would have to carry some rational warrant.  But, on the assumption that there 
is only one set of standards for appraising substantive explanatory claims about the 
world in the light of evidence, this makes this second interpretation of the ‘NOMA’ 
view incoherent.  If all explanations involving substantive, synthetic claims about the 
world must satisfy the same criteria, then it is simply nonsense to claim that religion 
can explain the scientifically inexplicable.  To deny the assumption and assert instead 
that there are different standards of explanation in the different fields is simple 
relativism. And I assume that this is acceptable to no one in this debate.  For one 
thing, if we allow different standards for explanations in religion, why not also in the 
study of the paranormal, or voodoo or scientology or … and so the list goes on?  (I 
will address this view again, from a somewhat different angle, later.)   
 
I take it, then, that the only coherent version of the NOMA doctrine, the only one that 
thoughtful commentators might really want to defend, is quite different from the two 
so far considered.  This third version sees religion as advancing no descriptive 
doctrine at all, as making no real claims about the way the world really is, but ‘only’ 
as making claims about what is and what is not valuable, what is and what is not a 
worthwhile life.  This view concedes to science exclusive rights to inform us about 
the world of fact (understood in the broad sense to include general structural features) 
and accepts that religion is restricted to the world of value.  This is certainly the 
version advocated by Gould: 
Science tries to document the factual character of the natural world, and to 
develop theories that coordinate and explain these facts. Religion, on the other 
hand, operates in the equally important, but utterly different realm of human 
purposes, meanings and values – subjects that the factual domain of science 
might illuminate, but can never resolve. ((2001), p.4) 
 
Obviously, this view of religion does indeed eliminate any possibility of a clash 
between it and science.3  But at what a price! (My advice here to religious people 
would be to avoid scientists bearing gifts.) For one thing, the religious person who 
adopts this view cannot call on any of the usual justifications for whatever value-
system she endorses.  She cannot, for example, claim that one ought to ‘love thy 
neighbour as thyself’ because this is what pleases our loving creator.  This 
justification, of course, along with any of its ilk, involves a claim of exactly the sort 
from which she must now abstain.   Avoiding the conflict in this way means 
abstaining from asserting any descriptive claim – not just specific claims about Adam 
and Eve or the virgin birth or the like that thoughtful religious people often have 
difficulty with in any case, but also more general ones about our possessing souls, or 
even about the universe being the creation of a superhuman ‘entity’ or ‘force’ – and 
treating all such claims as, at best, merely metaphorical. 
 
I concede to no one in my appreciation of the importance of issues about what sorts of 
lives are valuable, and about ethical issues more generally.  But coming to a view on 
such issues is surely not the exclusive prerogative of religious people.  (Gould 
acknowledges this and in fact quietly takes the ’magisterium’ of ‘religion’ to consist 
of the discussion of ethical issues, whether or not based on religion in the more usual 
                                                 
3 Actually it isn’t so obvious – there is a substantial literature examining the issue of whether the 
domains of fact and value are logically distinct. None the less it is true. 
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sense.4)  More centrally for current purposes, it seems very doubtful that a religious 
faith stripped of any substantive descriptive claim about the universe, its history and 
its creation can really count as a religious belief.  The theologian, Ian Barbour, surely 
has it right: 
 
… religious language does indeed express and evoke distinctive attitudes.  It 
does encourage self-commitment to a way of life; it acknowledges allegiance to 
ethical principles and affirms the intention to act in particular ways.  But … 
these non-cognitive uses presuppose cognitive beliefs. … [R]eligious faith is not 
simply assent to the truth of propositions; but it does require the assumption that 
certain propositions are true.  It would be unreasonable to adopt or recommend 
a way of life unless one believes that the universe is of such a character that this 
way of life is appropriate.  (Barbour (1974), p.58) 
 
And once a religious faith ‘requires’ such beliefs about the universe then the clash 
with science (or more accurately the scientific attitude) is inevitable.  Or so I now go 
on to argue. 
 
 Three types of religious belief, three types of clash with science 
 
Many beliefs about the world, its origins and structure have been, and are, held in the 
name of religion.  In order to examine carefully the issue of whether science and 
religion clash we need to differentiate at least three types. 
 
Into the first category fall quite specific beliefs about the universe and its history that 
some believers have certainly held (and in some cases presently hold) on the basis of 
their religion, but which are directly inconsistent with well-accredited scientific 
theories. One example is the claim that the earth is stationary in absolute space and 
that the sun and other planets orbit it; another is the claim that there were two humans, 
Adam and Eve, who had no ancestors, either human or human-like, and of whom all 
humans are descendants (or more generally the claim that the universe was created 
with essentially the same flora and fauna it presently exhibits in 4004 B.C.).   I shall 
take it that no one seriously disputes that such claims are indeed inconsistent with 
well-accredited scientific theories.5  However, no serious thinker any longer feels the 
need to defend the first claim on Biblical grounds – even the Vatican now thinks that 
its attack on Galileo, and his Copernican allies, was a mistake (though it did take it 
until 1820 to remove Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus from its Index of forbidden 
books).  And none but a few (though very noisy) fundamentalists still feel the need to 
defend the second claim on Biblical grounds.  Again, even the Vatican seems to have 
reconciled itself to the idea that evolutionary theory is more than a mere ‘hypothesis’.  
 
I shall not go into details about either these particular claims or others of similar 
status.  There is of course an enormous literature on such matters.  I shall simply 
assume that the upshot of this literature is that,  
 
                                                 
4 ‘[I] construe as fundamentally religious (literally, binding us together) all moral discourse on 
principles that might activate the ideal of universal fellowship among people.’ (Op. cit., p.62) 
5 Anyone in any remaining doubt about the ineradicable clash between so-called ‘scientific’ 
creationism and real science should consult Philip Kitcher’s excellent (1982). 
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(i) on the one hand, such claims are directly inconsistent with well-accredited 
scientific theories (and indeed that where this is true it is the erstwhile 
religious claim that must, from a rational point of view, give way); while,  
(ii) on the other hand, there is no need for a religious person to commit herself 
to any such precise claim – a person may remain, in a clear sense, a 
religious believer without committing herself to any such claim that is (or 
at any rate is so obviously) inconsistent with well-accredited scientific 
theories.  
 
While having seemingly reconciled itself to the (likely) truth of Darwinism, the 
Vatican, if I have understood its position correctly, continues to insist that there is 
some point along the branch of the evolutionary tree from chemical molecules to 
current humans at which ‘souls’ were ‘infused’ into some organism.6  Such a belief, 
along with other relatively general beliefs about souls and like ‘entities’, falls into a 
second category.  This, I suggest, is the category of beliefs that while not, perhaps, 
directly inconsistent with any well-accredited theory in science nonetheless seem to 
be in a clear and strong sense contraindicated by science.7   
 
Nothing in neurophysiology is directly inconsistent with the claim that alongside the 
1011 or so neurons in the human central nervous system with their chemically-
governed activity there is another entity called the ‘soul’.  (Any more than that 
Newtonian gravitational theory is directly inconsistent with the claim that the reason 
why every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other with a force 
proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of 
the distance between them is that each such particle possesses an immaterial mind 
which happens to will this to be the case.)  It is just that neurophysiology has no need 
for such a hypothesis – the ‘soul’ simply and increasingly has no role to play (any 
more than those particulate ‘minds’ would have any role to play in gravitation theory).  
Neurophysiology is, of course, a science still very much in its infancy, but it has 
already made impressive strides in explaining, in its own – ‘purely material’ - terms, 
phenomena such as memories and pains that earlier thinkers held were in some 
irreducible sense ‘mental’ and hence required some sort of ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’ whose 
properties and states they were.  The religiously inclined could, then, readily identify 
the ‘soul’ with such a ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’.  But minds or spirits separate from bodies are 
no longer seriously available.  There remain interesting and challenging issues about 
whether or not human psychology is fully ‘reducible’ to the laws of nature governing 
matter.  But these are to do with whether or not mental properties can be reduced to 
material properties - no serious scientist (even if religiously-inclined) still holds any 
version of the Cartesian dualist view of a mental substance that is separate from the 
matter of the brain and central nervous system. 
 
The reason why the soul can play no role, and why the idea of it gets in the way of 
proper scientific theorizing, is that the idea not only has no empirical support, it 
inevitably – in principle – can have no such support.  There is reason to think (from 
                                                 
6 See again the sympathetic treatment in Gould (2001). 
7 Of course, I take it here that talk of souls and the like is to be understood in some ‘literal’ sense – one 
that if true would make a factual difference to the way the world is - and not in any ‘metaphorical’ 
sense or sense that makes claims about the existence of souls some sort of hidden moral injunction. As 
already indicated, I readily concede that all ‘conflict’ between science and religion can be eliminated 
by going fully ‘metaphorical’ or restricting religious claims entirely to claims about values. 
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the way that progressive science is going) that all the observable effects here are 
produced by neurophysiology and that the ‘soul’ can therefore itself have no 
observable causal effects.  There is a principle of good scientific reasoning – 
sometimes called ‘Ockham’s razor’ - that is incorporated in one form or other into 
every sensible system of scientific confirmation, and which states that if some notion 
plays no role in, if it can be excised without cognitive loss from, our system of 
knowledge then it should be so excised.  This principle is uniformly applied within 
science itself.  The 19th century idea of a space-filling aether  - a mechanical medium 
that was alleged to be the seat of the electromagnetic field (and earlier the carrier of 
the disturbances that constitute light) – is now rejected by physics.  But the notion was 
rejected not because it is actually inconsistent with any new well-accredited scientific 
theory, but rather because it is – provably – otiose.  Once we have the real science, in 
this case the special and general theories of relativity, then further postulating the 
aether makes no empirical difference – not only is there no empirical evidence of its 
existence, there cannot be any such evidence.  The same applies to this sort of 
intermediate second category of religious claim – exemplified by the idea of the soul. 
 
This second category of religious belief slides over into a third.  Beliefs in this third 
category are the most general of all – one example would be just a general belief that 
the universe was created by (whatever that might actually mean) a superhuman power 
(whatever that might actually be).  A retreat to claims in this third category may bring 
with it, for the religious person, the advantage of avoiding the need to account for 
why two religious persons selected at random from the world’s population are likely 
to have apparently quite different specific beliefs – those differences being clearly 
correlated with accidents of birth, culture and geography.  What you are likely to 
believe about the speed of light or the half-life of particular isotopes of uranium, if 
you hold any such beliefs at all, is unlikely to depend on whether you were born and 
educated in Shanghai, Sydney or Suez.  But what specific religious beliefs you are 
likely to hold, assuming you hold any, are highly dependent on where you were born 
and educated.  This fact, which surely ought to be disturbing for the thinking believer, 
may, perhaps, be nullified if one resorts to the very general level of belief – perhaps 
all religious people agree that the universe is the creation of some sort of superhuman 
power and perhaps all the more specific claims should be thought of as merely 
metaphorical (and it must be said then pretty misleading) ways of endorsing that 
general one.  (I take it that something like this is what J.S.Haldane had in mind when 
claiming that ‘behind the recognized churches, there is an unrecognised church to 
which all may belong’.8)  
 
A general claim of this kind not only fails to be inconsistent with any scientific claim, 
the structure of science itself guarantees that consistency.  Let me then first explain 
why this is so, and then why I, none the less, hold that belief in even such general 
claims is unscientific. 
 
Explanation in science is essentially derivative.  In order to avoid unnecessary 
complexities, assume we are back in the 19th century before relativity theory 
superseded Newtonian ‘classical’ physics.  If you had asked a scientist at that time 
why it is that the planets move in the way they do, why for example they move in 
(somewhat perturbed) elliptical orbits around the sun, then he would have had a ready 
                                                 
8 Gifford Lecture, 1927 (quoted from Gould (2001), p.92) 
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answer.  He could show that the assertion that the planets will move in that way 
follows logically from Newton’s theory of mechanics plus universal gravitation 
(actually together with an ‘initial condition’ about the planet’s velocity).  Given that 
every material particle in the universe attracts every other with a force proportional to 
the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance 
between them, then it follows that a planet must move in a (roughly) elliptical orbit 
around the sun.  But suppose you asked such a 19th century scientist to explain in turn 
the ‘given’ in that initial explanation – to explain why Newton’s theory itself is true: 
not why he thought it was true (a question about evidence) but, assuming for the sake 
of argument that it is true, why the universe obeys Newton’s theory rather than any 
other.  Why, for example, is the gravitational force inversely proportional to the 
square of the distance rather than, say, to the cube of the distance?    Our 19th Century 
physicist would be nonplussed by this question.  Again, he can readily explain how he 
‘knows’ that it’s the square of the distance – that assumption and only that assumption 
yields the right observational results - but we are now considering an ontological 
question not an epistemological one: that of why the universe happens to obey this 
particular law (assuming that it does) rather than any other.  And the only answer to 
that question that our physicist could give was some variation on the theme of ‘that’s 
the way the cookie crumbles’.  Relative to the state of science at the time it had to be 
taken as just a ‘brute fact’ that the universe instantiates Newton’s theory. 
 
Nothing of course prevents a scientist from attempting to go deeper, from attempting 
to explain why Newton’s theory holds.  Indeed, one eminent scientist who endorsed 
that attempt was Isaac Newton himself - he famously denied that gravity could be an 
‘essential property’ of matter and hence denied that his theory could be the ultimate 
explanatory ‘bottom line’.  Newton was tempted by a Cartesian-style explanation of 
gravity in terms of some pressure-gradient in an all-pervading elastic aether (though 
he himself established that Descartes’ own particular explanation along these lines 
was hopeless).  Suppose that Newton had succeeded, that he had produced a theory 
about the constitution of a space-filling plenum, pressures in which gave bodies a 
tendency to move towards one another in accordance with his principle of universal 
gravitation. The logical point would of course remain: while we then had an 
explanation for the state of affairs described by Newton’s theory, the facts about this 
plenum and its properties that did the explaining would then themselves be 
unexplained, those facts would be – as science would then have stood – unexplained 
explainers.  Explanation must always start somewhere, no matter what stage science 
has achieved.  Yesterday’s ‘brute facts’ may indeed become today’s explained facts – 
if so, then science has made progress; but the logic of scientific explanation makes the 
existence of some ‘brute facts’ inevitable at any stage. 
 
This is what provides the (logically inevitable) latitude for the religiously inclined.  
Since the attempt to reduce gravity to the actions of an aether failed, the poor scientist 
cannot explain why the force of gravity between two bodies happens to be inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them; but the religious person, it 
seems, has no problem – that’s how the creator willed it to be.  Or, to take a more up-
to-date example, the scientific cosmologist cannot explain why it was that the so-
called escape velocity of matter at ‘Planck time’ shortly after the big bang had the 
value it did – she must just take it as a ‘brute fact’ (in that case a brute fact reflecting 
an ‘initial condition’ rather than a law of nature).  The religious person can, as always, 
‘explain’ that value by invoking a creator and his wishes – and indeed can, in that 
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case, add a little more to the story, as we ‘know’ on scientific grounds that if the value 
of that escape velocity had been just a little different than it in fact was then galaxies 
(and hence humans) could never have formed.  God fixed the value of the escape 
velocity because he wanted it to be possible for humans to evolve. 
 
Although the structure of science inevitably leaves religion free to claim it can give 
‘deeper’ explanations than science, what could warrant such claims? As I explained 
earlier, a version of the ‘no conflict’ (NOMA) account can be developed by allowing 
different standards for explanations in the two fields. But only, as we saw, at the 
surely unacceptable cost of adopting a purely relativistic viewpoint.  If, as I urge, we 
refuse to pay that cost, then the credentials of these alleged religious explanations 
must be examined in the same way, by the same standards, as are scientific 
explanations; but if judged in that way, then those alleged explanations fail. 
 
Notice first that once every one is playing by the same (exacting) rules, then any 
claim that religion is in a superior position from the point of view of explaining the 
world is logically misplaced.  A religious explanation in terms of a creator and his 
intentions is just another (attempted) explanation and, even were it accepted, then, 
exactly as the request for an explanation of the latest scientific theory can always be 
made, so we can request an explanation of the religious claim: why did the creator 
choose an inverse square law rather than, say, an inverse cube one?  why was the 
possibility of human evolution part of the creator’s plan?  The idea that religion can 
do what science cannot by ‘explaining everything’ is an illusion. 
 
This shows that the religious ‘explanation’ can, at best, achieve parity – in fact parity 
is far beyond its reach.  Let’s retreat just a little and ask why it was, for example, that 
the attempt to explain the law of gravity in terms of pressure gradients in a plenum 
was eventually deemed to be a failure.  It could obviously and trivially simply have 
been claimed that there is an all-pervading medium and that – without specifying 
exactly how – there just happen to be pressure-gradients set up in it that account for 
the gravitational attraction.  But such an ‘explanation’ would never be accepted in 
science because it is entirely ad hoc (in the pejorative sense) – it permits no 
independent test.  All the alleged explanation does is to deliver what we already know 
– indeed in the form I gave it, it was precisely designed so as to deliver that and only 
that. 
 
A successful explanation, one that will be accepted in science, on the contrary, is 
independently testable and passes independent tests – that is, it not only entails the 
results it set out to entail, it also makes, often surprising and hitherto unsuspected, 
empirical predictions which turn out to be correct.  Independent testability, and 
success in independent tests, is the key to scientific progress.9  The explanation of 
Kepler’s laws of planetary motion by Newton’s theory was a scientific success (and 
the theory was correspondingly regarded as empirically highly confirmed) because 
that theory turned out to entail not only those laws (or rather, in fact, a modified 
version of them) but also entailed a range of other testable predictions – about the 
precession of the equinoxes, the return of Halley’s comet and so on (and later of the 
existence of a hitherto unsuspected planet) all of which turned out to be correct.  The 
wave theory of light, developed by the French physicist Fresnel in the early 19th 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Lakatos (1974) 
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century, not only explained known optical effects, like reflection and refraction, it 
also turned out correctly to predict the existence of hitherto unsuspected and 
surprising phenomena – such as that the centre of the (geometrical) shadow of a small 
opaque disc held in light diverging from a point source is illuminated, and illuminated 
just as strongly as if no obstacle were held in the light’s path. 
 
The ‘explanation’ of, say, the facts revealed by Newton’s theory or the value of the 
‘escape velocity’ of matter (or, of course, of any other feature of the universe) by the 
postulation that those facts reflect the wishes of a creator is, on the contrary, 
essentially non-independently testable.  It is not just that such postulations happen to 
fail to be independently testable as yet.  They can never in principle be subjected to 
independent tests – precisely because, unlike real successful explanations, they are 
explicitly designed to yield the already known facts (inverse square attraction, value 
of the ‘escape velocity’) and nothing more. 
 
Science not only declines to accept theories that fail to be independently testable, it 
positively rejects them.  When a whole series of investigators including, as I 
mentioned, Newton himself consistently failed to produce any deeper account of 
gravity in terms of pressure-gradients in mechanical medium that was independently 
testable, then science adopted the view that there was no such deeper account to be 
had, and, despite initial reservations, accepted that matter just does act on other matter 
at a distance.  Similarly the initial reaction to Maxwell’s postulation of the 
electromagnetic field was that such a field could not simply be a mysterious, primitive 
feature of the universe, the electric and magnetic field strengths at each point of space 
had to reflect the contortions of some underlying mechanical space-filling medium 
(our old friend the aether).  But when a whole series of investigators (again including, 
interestingly enough, the chief scientific innovator, in this case Maxwell) tried and 
failed to produce ‘mechanical models’ of the field that were independently testable 
and independently confirmed, science came reluctantly to the view that the field is 
indeed a sui generis, independent, primitive part of the furniture of the universe – that 
is, the mechanical aether, at least as an underpinning of the electromagnetic field, was 
rejected. 
 
I conclude that this third and most general type of belief, although not actually 
inconsistent with any substantive scientific theories, none the less runs counter to the 
practices that have informed successful science; and hence such beliefs too are 
unscientific. Some particular religious beliefs are inconsistent with well-accredited 
scientific theories, but all are inconsistent with a scientific attitude. Religious belief 
must, as Tennyson so eloquently reminds us in the second of my two mottoes, rely on 
faith; and faith is unscientific. 
 
Objections, complexities and some food for further thought 
 
Not everyone who has contributed to the – very extensive – literature on the 
relationship between science and religion is likely to be convinced by the above 
argument.  (Indeed this may count as one of the all-time understatements, even by 
customary English standards!)  In a longer treatment, objections would need to be 
met, complexities unravelled, and, above all, further confusions exposed and clarified.  
Let me end by indicating – in rough outline – some of the necessary elaborations, if 
only in the attempt to facilitate further thinking about the issue. 
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1. Belief in Science 
 
I have talked so far as if science and religion were two (conflicting) ways of 
generating beliefs about the world.  In fact, however, the relationship between science 
and (outright) belief is not at all straightforward.  As recent studies have underlined, it 
would be a bold thinker who, in view of the history of radical theory-change science, 
believed that our currently accepted best fundamental theories are true.  If any sort of 
belief concerning those fundamental theories is rationally mandated, it is at best belief 
in their approximate truth, which really amounts to the meta-level belief that those 
theories will be retained in ‘limiting-case form’ in any future replacement theories.  
(Einstein’s relativity theory is logically inconsistent with Newtonian theory, but yields 
the latter as a fully adequate approximation for cases of bodies moving at velocities 
small compared to that of light.)  Outright belief  - if reasonable at all - would be 
reserved for statements of evidence and, perhaps, for lower-level theories (such as that 
matter has some sort of atomic structure) that seem so firmly-entrenched that their 
replacement is inconceivable.  (This is reflected in the currently most popular formal 
account of the relationship between theory and evidence in science – personalist 
Bayesianism.  This sees rational agents as assigning probabilities (short of 1) to 
explanatory theories – probability one (effective certainty) being reserved for 
statements of evidence and of ‘background knowledge’.10)  I need hardly say perhaps 
that this, if correct, sharpens the clash between science and religion: if outright belief 
at least in fundamental, explanatory theories is not rational, that is, not scientific, even 
in science, despite their enormous empirical success, then the same must apply a 
fortiori to religious explanatory claims, which have no empirical success at all. 
 
2. Kuhnian ‘commitment’ in science 
 
In his interesting (1974), Ian Barbour suggests that developments in philosophy of 
science – notably in Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) - 
have reduced the differences between science and religion to differences of degree, 
rather than of kind. Barbour’s argument merits a more systematic rebuttal than can be 
given here.  My response, however, is that it relies on  overinterpretation of Kuhn’s 
views.  Kuhn does suggest that successful, mature science requires ‘faith’ in basic, 
paradigm-forming theories.  Scientists must have faith in those theories in order, for 
example, not to promote ‘anomalies’ into outright falsifications – holding that work 
within the paradigm will eventually solve them. However, nothing like religious faith 
is necessary here.  Scientists’ ‘commitments’ are temporary, pragmatic and 
defeasible. One needn’t have believed in the absolute truth of Newton’s theory in the 
19th century to see that the anomalies for it posed by observations of Uranus’s orbit 
were probably best dealt with within the Newtonian paradigm – ideas associated with 
that paradigm provided ways of approaching the problems with Uranus’s orbit 
(perhaps for example there was another planet in the heavens, so far misidentified and 
once its gravitational action on Uranus was taken into account the anomaly would 
disappear). Whereas had a mid-19th century scientist proposed to ‘abandon’ 
                                                 
10 See for example Howson and Urbach (1993). I should add that there are a number of Bayesian, 
probabilistic arguments for religious claims that I lack space to consider here  – see for example 
Swinburne (1990).  (Swinburne’s argument is subjected to heavyweight criticism by Adolf Grunbaum 
in his (2000) – see also Swinburne’s (2000) reply.) The arguments are tied to ideas about what can, and 
cannot, possibly count as an unexplained ‘brute fact’ – those ideas are considered briefly below. 
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Newtonian theory, he would have been left with absolutely no idea about how to 
proceed.  Moreover, anomalies must eventually be resolved and what counts as a 
resolution is clear and a fixed feature of science – scientific ‘faith’ is temporary and 
eventually called to evidential account (in this life!). 
 
3. Worries about independent testability 
 
My argument is over-simplified as it currently stands: not all accepted scientific 
explanations are independently testable.  For one example (there are many), the 
explanation of the failure to observe any stellar parallax that was (surely correctly) 
accepted in the 17th and 18th centuries was that there is indeed parallactic motion but 
the available telescopes were not sufficiently powerful to observe it.  (If we are on a 
moving observatory, the earth, then pairs of ‘fixed stars’ ought to seem at least 
slightly further apart when we are at our nearest point to them, than they do when we 
are furthest away.)  This explanation itself was certainly not independently testable – 
it simply explains away the problem it was introduced to deal with. Is this not exactly 
like the religious ‘explanations’ I have castigated as unscientific?  But notice two 
things.  First, the basic theories involved here – the Newtonian version of the 
Copernican view – were (massively) independently confirmed in other areas, by other 
phenomena.  So the ‘faith’ is underwritten.  Moreover, the lack of independent 
testability of even the specific theory is again of temporary duration – if telescopes 
had continued to improve in accuracy and still no parallax was observed, then the 
Newtonian/Copernican view would have been in unambiguous trouble.  The point 
about the difference between scientific and religious explanations therefore remains in 
tact. 
 
4. Explanation as ‘understanding’ or ‘making sense’ 
 
The discussion of the idea of scientific explanation has, in my view, been dogged 
from the beginning by certain associations of the word ‘explanation’ that ought to be 
excised. It is natural to think that explanation has something to do with (human) 
understanding, or ‘making sense’ of, the universe.  The whole structure of scientific 
explanation surely shows, however, that this is a mistake – all such explanation is 
derivative, and that means that we don’t ever really understand anything about the 
universe (why should we?).  Instead we simply attempt to describe it – eliminating 
minor mysteries (why do the planets move in ellipses?) in favour of major mysteries 
(why do all bodies attract one another in a certain way?).  
 
An objection to this that certainly merits consideration is that even scientists allow 
that some theoretical claims ‘make sense’ (reflect what can reasonably be taken as 
‘natural’ states of the universe) while others cannot be simply accepted as ‘brute 
facts’ but demand explanation.  It can then be argued that there are certain claims that 
must always remain brute facts on any scientific account (one much discussed 
contender is the fact that ‘there is something rather than nothing’)11 but which cannot 
rationally be taken as brute and that this therefore gives rational credit to religious 
claims which can explain them (and hence remove their erstwhile brutish character).  
                                                 
11 I cannot resist here citing Adolf Grunbaum’s response to Richard Swinburne on this issue: 
‘Surprisingly, Swinburne deems the existence of something or other to be ‘extraordinary’, i.e. literally 
out of the ordinary. To the contrary, surely, the most pervasively ordinary feature of our experience is 
that we are immersed in an ambiance of existence.’ ((2000), p.3) 
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I can in response here only state my own view: namely that all conceptions about 
what ‘makes sense’ or what are plausibly ‘natural’ states of the universe are 
historically conditioned by the successful research programmes at the time, and hence 
are themselves subject to change in the light of the always dominant criterion of 
independent empirical support. Aristotelians demanded an explanation for any 
motion, Newtonians only for any change in motion; pre-quantum theory explanation 
in physics demanded a determinist theory, now that is no longer taken for granted; 
once Newtonian theory was established (and the aether-reductionist approach had 
failed), scientists were happy (for a while!)  to take, the hitherto barely thinkable, 
action-at-a-distance as a brute fact.  I hold, then, that there is no such thing as a fact 
that ‘cannot be taken as brute’ – the sort of assumption that a scientist is happy to take 
as reflecting a brute fact is historically conditioned and historically variable.     
 
 
5. Am I the victim of an evidentialist prejudice? 
 
Finally, I have made it clear that my whole argument rests on the assumption that a 
rational, scientific person needs good evidence before admitting god into her 
worldview, just as she would before admitting, say, electrons into it.  Alvin Plantinga 
has mounted a well-known defence of the striking claim that belief in god can be 
‘properly basic’ – that is, taken to require no evidence.12  Although again it requires 
detailed treatment which I cannot give here, I should at least indicate my response.  
This is that, on analysis, Plantinga’s view amounts to no more than the obviously true 
descriptive claim, that some people as a matter of fact take belief in god as basic.  But 
this is no news, the question of course is whether or not they are justified in doing so; 
and, in so far as Plantinga has anything to say about this issue, it seems to rest on the 
sort of simple-minded relativism that I have throughout taken to be eschewed.   His 
response, for example, to the obvious question of why in that case one couldn’t take 
belief in a flat earth (or come to that, the innate superiority of the ‘Aryan’ race) as 
‘properly basic’ seems to be simply that no Christian would in fact take – or is under 
any obligation to take - such beliefs as ‘properly basic’.  This, however, is plainly not 
the issue – the question is what such a Christian would say to someone who did assert 
as ‘properly basic’ (that is on no basis at all) a claim that s/he, the Christian, found 
abhorrent – and, assuming that she would want to challenge that claim how s/he 
would deal with the tu quoque objection.  Long live evidentialism!13
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